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ANIMALS, BRAINS, AND SPIRITS
Charles Taliaferro

This paper contains an overview of the significance of dualism for theism
and a modal argument for dualism. It concludes with remarks on the relevance of the modal case on behalf of dualism for an intramural materialist
quarrel between animalists and brain-identity theorists.

The Perils and Prospects of Dualism
There are some very good reasons why theists want to explore nondualist theories in the philosophy of mind. Dualism appears to face
intractable problems accounting for mind-body interaction, for the individuation of nonphysical beings, and for our knowledge of the mental
life of other persons. Dualism seems vulnerable to private language
arguments (can dualism account for the meaningfulness of mental discourse?) and dualism is often considered a prime target for Ockham's
razor. Moreover, dualism is often considered public enemy number one
on religious and ethical grounds. It faces the charge of promoting a Iifethreatening, body-denigrating asceticism, of encouraging homocentric
approaches to the environment, and of favoring an ethic of individualism more generally. It has also been accused of advancing a sexist agenda that privileges a male bias in matters of inquiry and substance.
Within contemporary Christian theology, dualism has often been cast
as a Hellenistic import, more Athens than Jerusalem, and many hold
that authentic Christianity is holistic, if not materialistic. If Christian
theism can be shown to be compatible with theories other than dualism
it may be seen as more stable (rejection of dualism need not entail rejection of Christianity) and perhaps slightly less offensive to those drawn
to naturalism. In brief, dualism is often considered extravagantly
wrongheaded-politically, ethically, scientifically, aesthetically, theologically and philosophically.
Notwithstanding the ghastly legacy of dualism and the promise of
more in-vogue alternatives, I think caution is in order, at least from the
vantage point of classical theism. Many of the reasons employed to
argue against mind-body dualism have been used with equal relish to
argue against the traditional theistic understanding of God and the
incarnation. So, the objection to dualism that mind-body interaction
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involves something altogether unintelligible because causal relations can
only be realized between physical entities constitutes an objection to theistic claims about God who, as a nonphysical reality, causally affects the
physical world, sustains it in existence, miraculously reveals Godself in
human history, and becomes incarnate. Many philosophers and theologians explicitly link their doubts about dualism with their doubts about
traditional theism (Paul Edwards, Kai Nielsen, Michael Martin, Anthony
Kenny, Jonathan Barnes, Richard Rorty, Grace Jantzen, and others).!
These critics are right, I believe, in thinking that dualism and theism
enjoy a close conceptual affinity, and there is therefore some reason for
theists to defend the coherence of dualism at certain key points even if
they do not embrace it as an accurate portrait of how things stand in this
world. It may well be that metaphysically less loaded positions in the
philosophy of mind like functionalism (which is allegedly quite neutral
about the truth of dualism) can be of use to theists in defending the
intelligibility of some theistic claims, but these moves alone will not succeed in confronting some important anti-theistic obstacles. 2
I believe tha t a fairminded, reasoned case against dualism must take
seriously the ways in which a version of dualism may do justice to the
unified nature of embodied life. Insofar as one takes a substantive dualist stance that goes beyond property dualism (a la Kripke, Chisholm,
others), one may well contend that the person qua nonphysical individual can exist apart from his or her body, either altogether disembodied
or in a different embodiment. From a substantive, dualist perspective,
personal identity is possible notwithstanding such body-switching. This
conforms to the Cartesian principle, according to which possible ontological separability (God can preserve' A' without 'B') is a sufficient condition for individuation.' But allowing for this under exotic conditions
does not mean that under ordinary, embodied conditions the person
should be treated as a bifurcated, split reality. Critics like Ilham
Dillman, Anthony Kenny, George Baker, P.M.S. Hacker, Daniel Dennett,
Paul Snowdon, and others continue Gilbert Ryle's strategy of harnessing
dualists with a fragmented picture of the mind-body relationship. Some
caricature dualism as positing a cloudy, marshmallow-like ghost circling
the body or as a tiny person, an homunculus, hidden behind a gross
material body.' These comic pictures do not seem to me to be at all fair.
I believe a dualist can understand embodiment in profoundly integrated
terms in which the person's affective, sensory, cognitive, and conative
life are fully realized materially. According to what may be called integrative dualism, embodiment involves a truly unified life in which (ideally) one's body is felt from within (proprioceptively), and one feels,
thinks and acts as a psycho-physical whole. An integrative dualist need
not deny that a person sees, thinks, acts and feels as a complete, wholly
embodied being. In an integrative understanding of the person-body
relation, the relation is not cast as the relation of a pilot in a ship, nor a
person in a chariot or in prison or wearing a suit.
If one takes on board this integrative picture of the mind-body relationship, one can see one's way through such ethical objections as the
claims that dualism automatically denigrates bodily life, or treats the

ANIMALS, BRAINS, AND SPIRITS

569

body as inconsequential to human welfare, or promotes anti-environmentalism. Indeed, one may embrace dualism along with a more comprehensive, "green" understanding of the ways in which our integrative
embodiment is tied in with a whole network of natural relations. As for
nonhuman animals, most contemporary dualists adopt a dualist understanding of nonhuman animal life. Dualism need not be Cartesian in its
construal of animal mentality. Paradoxically, those most set on denying
mental life to nonhuman animals (and thus those most sympathetic to
Descartes' anthropocentrism) are hostile to dualism (e.g. R G. Frey).
Many of the theological objections to dualism are based on isolating a
Cartesian or Platonic version of dualism rather than the integrative alternative. Thus, some object to dualism because of its treating the person
(soul, mind or self) as innately immortal and hence as something more
Platonic than Biblical. But such immortalism is not entailed by a dualist
treatment of the person; the metaphysical possibility of surviving death
by body-switching or disembodiment does not amount to a guarantee
this will occur. It is also due to the prominence of an exaggerated
Platonic-Cartesian portrayal of the person-body relation that dualism is
thought to be at odds with Christian teaching about the incarnation, crucifixion, resurrection, and ascension. Because we are nonphysical and
yet embodied beings, claims about Christ's embodiment are not compromised by Christ's nonphysicality. I believe that a traditional,
Chalcedonian understanding of the incarnation requires a profoundly
integrated view of embodiment as well as recogition of the pre-existence
of Christ, and thus it will require a dualist anthropology.s
Let me fill out my proposal of integrative dualism in cognitive terms.
I believe the integration of our cognitive faculties should be seen as part
of the integrated person-body relation. On this front, an integrative
dualist may draw on Alvin Plantinga's recent work on warrant (though
other frameworks might also be employed such as Linda Zagzebski's
virtue epistemology). For Plantinga, warrant is a matter of true beliefs
being acquired by cognitive faculties functioning properly. He resists
various forms of internalism, because of their failure to accommodate
the many ways in which doing our epistemic duty is compatible with a
host of disfunctions, such as being subject to brain lesions, tumors, wayward bursts of cosmic energy, Alpha Centaurian cognitive scientists,
and Demonic tempering. Anyone of these disasters is capable of
prompting true beliefs in ways that dramatically undermine claims of
warrant. 6 Most of these disfunctions can be read as respects in which a
mind-body integrated embodiment is impaired. I do not propose that
warranted beliefs (as analyzed by Plantinga) are essential for dualistic
embodiment; one can be embodied and yet subject to many cognitive
impairments. My thesis is that flagrant cognitive disfunctions can readily be understood as compromising or breaking down an integrated,
dualistic embodiment. Warranted embodiment is a feature of a developed integrative psycho-physical life.
This integrative person-body relation is something I have sought to
articulate in Consciousness and the Mind of God, grounding it in the goodness of God. 7 I shall only briefly note here my strategy, again drawing
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on Plantinga's work. Plantinga uses his treatment of warrant in articulating reasons for embracing theism, with proper cognitive functioning
analyzed as functioning the wayan all-good God intends. This move
recalls Descartes' appeal to God's goodness in his account of cognitive
reliability and, before that, of Plato, for whom the Good "imparts ... the
power of knower to the known."8 In my book I have sought to do
something similar by combining theories of value, cognition, and some
recent work in psycho-analysis. It is the goodness and practical reason of
those charged with raising children that is essential for fully realizing
integrative embodiment. In the work of Melanie Klein and others, one
can see how affective, cognitive, and conative interplay aimed at the
child's welfare plays a crucial role in the child's developing identity.
Within an integrative picture of person-body embodiment one can, I
believe, give pride of place to such intersubjectivity and eschew the narrow individualism and the isolation often thought to dog dualism in all
its forms. This sort of upbringing-what a Kleinian may call a mind
within a milld-can provide a model of what the Creator-creation relation amounts to, thereby reflecting an integrative understanding of
God's immanent presence in the world."
While there are various reasons whv theists should be hesitant to construe the God-cosmos relation as analogous to the person-body relation
(e.g. presumably creaturely autonomy and contingency over against
God's will and aseity constitute disanalogies), there are reasons for
underscoring some kinship. For those of us who are passibilists, believing God is affectively present to the cosmos, sorrowing over its ills and
taking delight in its goods, the ways in which dualism treats personbody dependency is illuminating. William Wainwright introduces a
note of caution here.
Mind-body interactionism would seem to provide a more
appropriate model of the God-world relationship, but it is objectionable on two counts. According to classical theism, God acts
upon the world but the world does not act upon God.
Furthermore, by allowing a certain independence of mind and
body, the model fails to provide for the radical dependence of
the world upon God which is so essential to classical theism.lO
As for mind-body models, Wainwright thinks the Platonist one with its
picture of a remote mind is more congenial to classical theism. This may
be, but the very reasons that give pause to Wainwright give sustenance
to those who are concerned with emphasizing the immanent, integrative
theology of creation, which is certainly a vital strand in the tradition
going back to Biblical testimony. In particular, a more integral understanding of God and creation allows us to respond to some feminist concerns. Consider Hilde Hein's complaint about Cartesianism and theism.
In dualism, the soul's principle activity of "unmoved, aloof" cognition is
without emotion. It is
untouched by the object it cognizes. Pure and dispassionate the-
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oretical knowledge is self-contemplative and has no practical
ends. Modeled upon a conception of the Divine as pure subject,
wholly self-sufficient, omnipotent and omniscient-mind, unencumbered by bodily needs or passions, is wholly free. 11
By thinking of God as passionate, affected by the cosmos by virtue of
God's creative activity and supreme goodness, we can provide an alternative to this more aloof Platonic model. 12
Why accept dualism? Like the distinction drawn in discussions
of the problem of evil between a defense and a theodicy, one might well
distinguish between defending the intelligibility of dualism from the
more ambitious aim of establishing its truth. Elsewhere I have sought to
undertake a defense of dualism, appealing, for example, to qualia in reply
to eliminativists, to various thought experiments in reply to functionalist
and private language arguments, and to the combination of dualism and
theism in reply to physicalist appeals to simplicity. There are a variety of
more positive arguments that would move us beyond a defense; these
include appealing to personal identity over time, mind-body interaction,
and the indivisibility of persons as basic subjects. 13 In the rest of this
paper I shall put in a plug for my preferred argument for dualism, a
Cartesian argument based upon the ostensible metaphysical possibility of
disembodiment and body-switching. I shall provide an outline of the
argument in the next section, reply to two objections, and conclude with
comments on a dispute internal to materialism. The version of the argument I adopt makes use of de re attributions of modal properties, the
principle of the indiscernibility of identicals, and thought experiments.

A Modal Argument for Dualism
There are reports of out of the body experiences (henceforth OBEs)
across many cultures throughout the world. Some reports are of great
antiquity while many are contemporary. There are many cases of first
person reports in the 20th century from persons of quite dissimilar backgrounds, ages, and religious outlooks, (A. J. Ayer, Somerset Maugham,
and Carl Jung all reported undergoing OBEs). Moreover, there are some
striking similarities in accounts from various religions of what OBEs will
occur after death. Compare, for example, the Tibetan Book of the Dead, the
Brhad Aranyaka Upanishad, and the Apocalypse of Abraham. Reports of
OBEs have been advanced with great vividness and detail in which-to
alter the words of T. S. Eliot-people take themselves to have left their
bodies on a distant shore (Four Quartets).14
I believe that such tales do describe something metaphysically possible, even if the occurrences of OBEs are induced by exclusively naturalistic causes (triggered by hypercapnia and hypoxia, vascular or ischemic
activity, and the like) and they do not represent cases of veridical perception by subjects that are actually functioning independent of their
bodies. We cannot endorse an unqualified Humean precept that conceivability ipso facto entails possibility, but we can, I think, claim that
careful conceiving of a state of affairs in which one attends to the details
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of the case and considers the intelligibility of the state of affairs with
respect to one's background knowledge independently secured, gives
one prima facie warrant in believing that what one takes to be metaphysically possible is indeed so. Conceiving of ostensibly possible states
of affairs can go astray on all sorts of grounds; our grasp of the individuals and properties involved may be truncated, we may fail to test our
modal intuitions adequately against background information, and so on.
But I submit that a presumption of warrant based on focused, critical
examination of the state of affairs at issue seems to reflect the standard
employment of thought experiments in everyday life (as pointed out by
Roy Sorensen in Thought Experiments) and that the use of dualist body
switching and disembodiment cases seems no worse than the use of
many forceful thought experiments in the literature in ethics, epistemology and other areas of metaphysics. ls Tailoring the appeal to thought
experiments to the first person, I believe I can coherently conceive of
myself switching bodies, coming to have a very different one, and my
present body ceasing to be. I can imagine myself coming to occupy one
of the shadowy levels of Dante's purgatory, for example, or switching
bodies with a king or pauper without any part of my body switching
places. I can also imagine more drastic disembodiment in which I
become, in the words of Olaf Stapleton, "a disembodied wandering view
point."'6 Such imagining amounts to my attributing to myself certain
properties my body does not have. I do not think it is plausible to
believe that physical objects-ships and human bodies, say-can
become nonphysical or switch places with other ships and bodies without exchanging physical parts. If such limitations and attributions are
reasonable, then, assuming the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals, it is reasonable to conclude I am not by body.
There are, of course, many objections to this line of reasoning. I use a de
re version of the argument to get around some of them. Thus I do not put
all the weight on an abstract de dicta claim like "There is nothing incoherent
or self-contradictory in the supposition that a person can exist disembodied." One might well adopt that claim and cheerfully point out that it is
quite compatible with particular persons being essentially embodied. It is
largely because of its de dicta formulation that Richard Swinburne's modal
argument comes under attack by Peter Unger, Sydney Shoemaker, William
Alston, and Thomas Smythe." I realize that the de re dualist argument will
strike some as unalterably primitive and anti-scientific, holding philosophy
of mind hostage to drug-induced visions, reports by clairvoyants, new age
religious propaganda, quixotic story telling about Etheric Projection (Astral
Projection), and pseudo-deaths. But, if dualism is not in conflict with what
we know scientifically and metaphysically (as I have sought to argue elsewhere), and if we can lucidly and soberly conceive of these out of the body
maneuvers, then I do not see why we should resist their force. I would go
further and claim that parapsychology gives us reason to believe in the
actual survival of some people after biological death for a brief period of
time, but for now I only appeal to OBE reports as backing up and filling
out what might otherwise be a merely academic thought experiment."
Is the argument question-begging? This is probably the most com-
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mon worry. I do not think one already has to be a dualist in order to
accept the out of body cases as bona fide metaphysical possibilities.
Probably many people have OBEs without being dualists; perhaps they
have no extant philosophy of mind at all. Of course, thought experiments can be cast as ways of making explicit what one already believes,
and herein lies Gilbert Harman's complaint that thought experiments do
not inform us about the nature of reality. However, unless we have good
reason to be radically skeptical about our beliefs, dualist thought experiments can be understood as sharpening our grasp of our own identity,
enabling us to bring ourselves into clearer focus and challenging rival
materialist assumptions. Also by way of replying to the objection of
question-begging, it is worth pointing out that some non-dualist philosophers have claimed that disembodiment andlor body switching is possible. In these cases the philosophers will use various devices to then
avoid embracing the dualist consequences by appealing to a de dicta
account of self-reference (Armstrong), counterparts in other possible
worlds (D. Lewis), a fluid compositional mer eo logy G. Pollock, R. Boyd,
and others). In a sustained case for dualism, I would underscore positively the admission by these philosophers of possible disembodiment and
body switching and then argue that their account of the possibilia is less
plausible than a dualist one. '9 Having breezed by some of the objections
and counter-arguments, let me develop in greater detail a reply to what
may be called the parity objection and the objection from natural kinds.

The Parity Objection
Can dualist thought experiments be easily undermined because they
can be countered with an equally plausible thought experiment to the
effect that we are identical with our bodies? Maybe I am nonphysical
yet materially embodied, but maybe, too, I am a physical animal with
nothing immaterial about me, or maybe I am a part of an animal, namely
a brain. Michael Hooker, Richard Boyd, Michael Tye, and Dean
Zimmerman have each challenged the dualist modal argument with
anti-dualist alternatives. 2<l For present purposes, let us refer to this as the
parity objection. If this strategy is plausible, then the dualist argument
is at a standstill.
Given the holist nature of integrative dualism I am not convinced that
person-body identity is as easily imagined as Hooker ct aT maintain. To
sharpen my objection, imagine a critic who is somewhat friendly to
dualism insofar as she believes that, at least initially, it seems possible
that persons to be disembodied, switch bodies and the like, and thus
(given some other assumptions noted earlier) it seems possible for persons are nonphysical, and yet she claims it seems equally plausible that
persons are the very same things as their animal bodies. Zimmerman's
statement of the parity objection is put in response to Swinburne, "It is
conceivable ... that I be identical with my body, or some part of it-this is
a state of affairs which I can imagine easily enough, and with as much
clarity as Swinburne's favored alternative."21 But how easy is it to distinguish two cases, one in which a person is the very same thing as his
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physical, animal body and another in which he is integrally embodied,
such that his being an animal consists of his dualistic, integral animal
embodiment? If one claims to imagine the identity by picturing their
conative, affective, cognitive, and sensitive embodiment, this would not
suffice, as the integrative dualist would insist on all such features. One
may attempt to secure the imagining of person-body identity by envisaging the demise of the body bringing about the demise of the person.
But this also does not suffice for, as noted earlier, being a dualist does
not require one to believe persons survive bodily death. I propose that
to distinguish the states of affairs of being identical with one's body as
opposed to being integrally embodied involves a substantial claim,
namely, that one is thereby imagining the impossibility of the person surviving the demise of their body. Meanwhile the dualist may distinguish
the two by relying upon thought experiments in which the person does
survive, say, in a different body. This difference, I submit, has some
epistemic advantage that throws the parity objection off balance, tipping
the scales toward dualism.
If I am right, do all identity claims suffer some kind of disadvantage
over against claims to distinguish objects? No, I advance my reply to
the parity objection when there is at least a live possibility that dualism
is right. There are many instances of identity claims where there are no
real competitors in the area. (Is this table this table? This question
might gain interest only if we were genuinely worked up about time
slices, mereological essentialism and the like.) I should add that my
response to the parity objection does not rely on the idea that conceiving
of possible states of affairs must involve forming visual imagery. Visual
imagery can assist our examination of what is possible, but it is not
essential.
Do the standard dualist scenarios also require commitments to strong
negative existentials? I imagine having a new body, see nothing metaphysically outrageous about it, and conclude it is possible. Zimmerman
has put to me this question: "How do you know that in your imagined
state of affairs you have not mistakenly overlooked the fact that your
original body still exists, and that you are identical with it and yet have
simply failed to notice it?"22 Richard Boyd once cautioned proponents of
the dualist modal argument on the grounds that physical objects can still
exist and yet not be detected. 23 Linda Zagzebski has also recorded dissatisfaction with the dualist modal strategy. "It is no harder to hide, or
rather ignore, brains in thought experiments about what can happen to
me than it is to hide the fact that water has a certain chemical structure
in thought experiments about the water in this glass."24
Perhaps, if persons or brains are physical points, imagining the
absence of a person or brain would be quite difficult. Very few, if any,
would embrace such a metaphysical spectacle (even the luz bone had
some sort of volume), and bulky, messy brains are, I believe, difficult to
hide in thought experiments. In reply to Zimmerman's objection, dualists will, of course, assume that while entertaining the disembodiment
thought experiment they are still integrally embodied in the way they
have always been and yet they are imagining some alternative configura-
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tion. I imagine being in Paris next spring and assume this is metaphysically possible. The fact that I am now in Minnesota does not undercut
the epistemic force of imagining the alternative, any more than conceding
it is possible that I could be in Paris without realizing it or that I could be
in Minnesota high on LSD and be absolutely convinced I am in Paris. 25
As I have advanced a de re modal argument without claiming that modal
intuitions are infallible, cases in which one can mistakenly suppose something is possible-whether it be water without H 20 or the trisecting of an
angle-do not show the argument is without force.
By way of a further reply to Zagzebski, I note the disanalogy with the
water-H20 case. Water being H 20 involves straightforward mereological
constitution in which increasingly close inspection of water in mass reveals
its structure. There is a seamless procedure of empirical investigation here,
whereas most philosophers (including noneliminative materialists) will
concede the person-body relation to be on a different footing. To be sure,
physicalists charge that empirical inquiry justifies their position, but typically they correctly observe that this is a matter of philosophical argument on
the basis of empirical data and not just a matter of empirical data alone.
Once we are aware of the empirical foundation for a water-H20 identity, it is
difficult to hide the H 20 in aquatic thought experiments. If the parity objector can establish that we are similarly warranted in endorsing person-body
identity, a defense of dualism will need to address that claim head on. The
dualist modal argument is advanced here on the assumption that empirical
inquiry does not definitively either favor or undermine dualism. I believe it
is possible to take on board the latest findings of the physical sciences and
yet conceive of disembodiment and body-switching with a clarity, detail,
and ostensible coherence that is not available in the water-H20 case.
Consider a final development of the parity objection to the effect that
the dualist is in just as much of a fix as the identity theorist. Assume
that physical objects are essentially physical and likewise for nonphysical
ones. By envisaging the person as nonphysical, am I not committed to
the grand metaphysical tour? I do endorse the great negative existential
(it is metaphysically impossible for me to be physicaD, but this conclusion emerges down the line. At the beginning, both dualist and identity
theorist can recognize the essentiality of metaphysical identity (if X is
physical, X is physical essentially). Let me set up the dualist argument,
making explicit its open-ended beginning. At the outset I consider the
state of affairs of my being embodied, unsure (let us say) whether this
amounts to my being dualistically embodied or being identical with this
physical body. I then consider cases in which I exist without this body.
These seem perfectly possible, violate no metaphysical precepts I am
aware of, and are actually supported by widespread (albeit in principle
defeasible) reports. I then, following the argument, conclude I am
indeed distinct from my body. It is because of my envisaging what I
take to be a bona fide, positive state of affairs (my having a different
body) that I come to attribute more robust negative existentials to
myself, not vice versa.
My reply to the parity argument should not be exaggerated. I submit
only that, when considering rival accounts of the person-body relation

Faith and Philosophy

576

that are granted initial plausibility, it is not as easy to envisage clearly
the identity as opposed to the dualist schema. One can grant this, of
course, and then go on to argue that materialism should still be preferred on other grounds.

The Natural Kinds Objection
Linda Zagzebski has objected to my de re modal argument based
upon a potent account of natural kinds and identity. The problem with
my argument is that it employs modal claims quite independent of concern for natural kinds, specifically, for our being animals.
Whatever natural kind I belong to is essential to me. So if I am
an animal I am essentially an animal, and if I am a human I am
essentially a human ... If we accept as an a priori truth that the
natural kind to which I belong is essential to me, then whatever
science discovers about the nature of humans or animals would
be essential to me. Presumably it is essential to animals to have
bodies, and likewise for humans. I conclude that the de re argument is threatened with failure provided that there is some such
a priori truth which connects the discoveries of empirical science
with the concept of the natural kind to which I belong
... Taliaferro says that we are animals, but since he denies that
we are essentially embodied, he must think that some animals
arc not essentially embodied. Since other animals presumably
are essentially embodied, to deny that we are is analogous to
admitting that water is a liquid but denying that chemical constitution is essential to the water in this glass while agreeing that
the chemical constitution of other liquids is essential to them. 26
Has the de re modal argument thereby run aground?
An integrative dualist can well maintain that the materially embodied
whole of person and body is essentially material. My animal body is
essentially material and as a material animal I am too. But Zagzebski is
right that I am calling into question whether it is essential to me (the
individual person) that I am embodied as I am and, thus, as this particular animal. Am I forced into a position similar to holding such desperate
beliefs about water? Not quite, though, for some, my views here may
seem wildly extravagant. It is not obvious to me that all individuals that
are nonhuman animals are in fact essentially embodied as they are. Do
the vast number of people who believe in reincarnation-in which there
is a trans-migration of souls across species-believe in something which
is metaphysically impossible? This is not clear, in my view. I will not
try to bolster my stance by advancing disembodiment and body-switching cases, such as Socrates becoming an alligator. Rather, I offer the
rejoinder of Joseph Butler to a similar objection. While I adopt a dualist
reading of both human and nonhuman animal life, Butler's modest position may be more appealing. According to Butler, we simply do not
know whether nonhuman animal beings of necessity lose their extant
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identity (what he referred to as their living powers) at biological disintegration, the dissolution of their membership in their specific natural
kind animal species. 27 Is the failure to see that the individuals can survive equivalent to seeing that they can't? I do not think so. Butler's
strategy here is similar to one that is now familiar in the problem of evil
literature in which much is made about the difference between not seeing the point of evil and seeing there is no point to eviP" I do not believe
we are currently justified in believing that reincarnation across species is
metaphysically impossible and thus not in a position to hold that individual animals essentially have the bodies they do.
In the absence of overriding, non-question-begging reasons for
accepting Zagzebski's view of individuals and animals, I do not think
the dualist modal argument is at all threatened. There is currently little
consensus on natural kinds among philosophers. The integrative dualist
may well agree that the physical sciences can identify essential features
of natural kinds (to be an alligator requires instantiating a substantial
subset of such and such properties) and yet either deny, as I do, that
individual animals are essentially embodied Of, more modestly, withhold judgment about the essential embodiment of all nonhuman animals. Should the modal dualist argument warrant believing we are not
essentially embodied and there be (as many believe) good reason to
think some nonhuman animals are persons, then a case may be made
that goes further than Butlerian agnosticism. 2c;
Concluding Remarks and Dualist Advice to Some Materialists

By way of trying to articulate further the resources of integrative
dualism, I conclude with comments on an intramural materialist debate
between animalists and brain centered materialists. This will, I hope,
throw into relief my response to the parity objection and showcase some
of the virtues of integrative dualism.
David Wiggens, Bernard Williams, Paul Snowden, and Quassim
Cassam are a few of the advocates of animalism, sometimes called
neoAristotelianism, which sees human beings as physical animals. They
oppose materialists who envisage the human person as principally the
brain, and who thereby pinpoint the locus of personal identity as the
grey cells. The debate is often focussed on the status of thought experiments, with the brain team (Mark Johnston among others) using revised
Robinson-Brown cases to bolster the judgment that the person goes with
the brain. In Mark Johnston's view, you go with your brain.") This is
opposed by animalists on a number of fronts, sometimes by the wholesale rejection of thought experiments but most often by charging that a
brain centered approach violates our customary, common sense way of
thinking of each other. If I am merely a brain, am I a human organism
or merely just a part of one? David Oderberg has recently put pressure
on the brain materialists to move toward either full-scale animalism or a
Parfitian psychological reductionism which gives pride of place to mental continuity without nonphysical substances. What to do?31
I suggest that brain centered materialists can use some of the same
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strategies I have in defending integrative dualism. They can, for example, contend that in a properly functioning enbrained life the person
may be properly identified as an animal. The claim that we are animals
is indeed true in a brain materialist scheme, as it is true also for integrative dualism. Describing oneself as an animal is, I believe, neutral with
respect to a host of accounts of what it is that constitutes one's being an
animal. Effectively securing this point helps to overturn some of the
ordinary language objections. As for thought experiments, I think the
brain materialists have the same modal edge over the anima lists that T
claimed for the dualists, though reports of brain transfers are less prevalent than person-body transfers!
In all, however, I think the present debate can highlight the merits of
dualism. Parfitian claims of psychological continuity sustained in bodytransferring thought experiments make one suspicious of positing a necessary connection between personal identity and the particular body or
brain one has. On the other hand, there is great appeal to the animal
and brain advocates' charge that their views have the advantage because
of their positing a substantial individual thing doing the thinking, feeling, and acting that comprises personal life. Those of us who are not
convinced that Humean bundles and Parfitian complexes can account
for personal identity, but are impressed by thought experiments that
bring to light the precariousness of brain and animal identity, are in a
bind. This is where integrative dualism of the kind defended here can
come in. It provides a substantive individual as the one who thinks, acts,
and feels, but one that is not essentially embodied as a specific animal or
brain, allowing body switching and disembodiment. 32
So, I submit that dualism has not outlived its usefulness. For theists
who resist the Hobbesian urge to think of God as corporeal-however
pure, simple and invisible-and who retain belief that God is a nophysical person-like reality, the debate over dualism can be a focal point for
defending key components in a philosophy of God. Dualism can, I
believe, be articulated in an integrative form that does not carry with it
the ethical and theological encumbrances often affixed to it. Moreover,
there is at least one argument for dualism, based on plausible thought
experiments, with a force that is commonly underestimated."
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functionalist theories denigrate the appeal to subjective, phenomenal states
they are often used to undermine dualist arguments.
3. Descartes' criterion of individuation is defended by W. D. Hart in The
Engine of the Soul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
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11. "Refining Feminist Theory," Aesthetics in Feminist Perspective ed. by
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between a person and his clothes (the Phaedo), and the soul-body and Godworld relations in Biblical literature. As an aside, I note that the case for
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Tennant.
14. A good annotated bibliography of the literature is Terry Basford's

580

Faith and Philosophy

Near-Death Experiences (New York: Garland Publications, 1990).
15. Thought Experiments (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
16. Last and First Men and Starmaker (New York: Dover, 1968), p. 268.
17. Shoemaker, Personal Identity, co-authored with Swinburne (Oxford:
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Richard Boyd's "Materialism Without Reductionism," Readings in Philosophy
of Psychology, ed. by Ned Block (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
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